港人優先?

上星期立法會討論「港人優先」議案,字面上聽起來好像是「媽媽是女人」的一條辯論題目。不過在當前中港矛盾的大勢之下,也一如所料變成各派網上聲討口水戰的題目。我對這個議案沒有太多好感,主要原因,是作為一條立法會的議案,用字實在太過不嚴謹。

第一個問題,當然是「港人」的定義。這個問題很困難,因為對於不同的政策,港人的定義也有所不同。例如一般的公共設施,好像是公園,我們考慮的是香港居民,當中可以包括菲傭、留學生、新來港人士,等等。他們在香港生活,以他們來作規劃的基礎是必然的選擇。香港居民和三粒星是兩個不同的概念,因為很多三粒星可以是住在溫哥華、多倫多和紐約等地,沒理由香港的城市規劃也要考慮他們,居民與否相對於三粒星與否在這兒是更重要的分野。另一個例子,是在香港的選舉當中投票,你除了要是香港的永久居民,更要在香港經常居住,兩者缺一不可。我們不容許留學生投票,也不容許溫哥華、多倫多和紐約的「香港橋民」投票。你說「港人」優先,好,但這港人是誰?是否在不同時間該有不同的定界?

第二個問題,就在於「優先」二字。議案的原文,是「在制訂政策時需以‘港人優先’ 為依歸」,但沒有說明是甚麼類型的政策。如果香港政府的每一個行為都是以港人優先為原則,其實是相當可怕的。例如萬一不幸一輛機場巴士失事,我們的救護員大概不會逐個傷者去問是香港居民還是遊客,然後優先照顧香港居民。又就算我們把港人的定義收窄為香港常住人口當中的永久居民,我們也不會在一個香港家庭和一個菲傭的官司之間,在任何一個司法程序當中偏坦港人。我可以認同「港人優先」作為某些政府政策的依歸,但肯定不是所有的政府政策。我當然不相信議案的動議人會提倡這些,但因為議案的用字如此不明不白,大可以被借用來支持和初衷相距很遠的看法。既然是立法會的動議辯論,是否能不要這麼空泛,變得可以隨意解讀?過去一週有不少朋友把這議案和歧視扯上關係,一方面我們可以質疑是否有人向動議人扣了不該扣的帽子,但既然這個議題本身是很有爭議性的,我們也得問問為何議案不可以寫得清楚一點,說明清楚「港人優先」到底是指什麼。

空洞地說一句「香港優先」,表面上好像是無可質疑,但不細緻一點說明便走去認同,也可以帶來危險。

香港的學位問題與移民問題

事先聲明,這個博的內容,都是一些 half baked 的想法,不一定完整。我會試圖不斷補充。

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近來因為北區幼稚園的入學問題,又帶起了香港的學位問題與移民問題之間的討論。

我認為,香港政府有責任優先照顧香港境內居民的教育需求。居民的意思,是你最少現時是以香港為家。如果你不是居於香港,香港政府可能也要幫助你,但排的應該是另一條隊。

讓我說明一下。首先,我對現時北區入學的混亂很不滿,但這兒沒有把問題定義為雙非與否,而是居所在港與否。理由倒也簡單,就是單看身分證出世紙,你不會知道一個孩子是或不是雙非,要把雙非區隔出來行政上本來就不容易。更重要的,是我想我們對雙非有意見的原因,並不是因為雙非這個身分本身,而是有一批人,本來和香港的聯繫不多,卻忽然沒有秩序地在香港湧現,影響了香港社會的日常運作。對於這個不滿,所謂的雙非其實不是一個很好的分類方法。舉個例,一個內地人和一個日本人在香港的第六年零十一個月生了個小孩,這小孩也算雙非,但小孩的父母其實都已經以香港為家,政府要預期如何為他們提供服務,也和其他的香港居民分別不大。相反,對於那數十萬早年移民美加澳紐的海外港人,他們的孩子定義上不是雙非,但如果他們都一下子走來香港讀書,所構成的社會壓力和現在在北區排隊的雙非父母是沒有分別的。因此,我認為以「境內居民」來定義問題,比用「雙非父母」來定義要準確一點。

事實上,以「境內居民」與否來考慮政府的應對,也乎合我們的社會預期。例如無論是本地怪獸家長的孩子,還是索馬里逃到香港的難民的孩子,都是活在香港,他們的教育需求我們都會照顧,因為這是一個現代社會應有之義。我們不應因為這個索馬里難民的孩子的入境地位,而質疑他受到教育的權利(不過據說在港難民的子女確實有入學困難)。

與此同時,回到剛才提到數以十萬計的境外港人,假設他們在溫哥華或者多倫多因為當地政策的問題找不到學位,雖然他們也有三粒星,但我懷疑港府是否有責任幫助他們;而就算要幫助,也應該和香港境內居民的需求分開處理。嚴格來說,住在深圳的雙非和住在溫哥華的海外港人,同樣都是不住在香港境內的香港永久居民,可以類似的思路去想。如是者,住在深圳的雙非,港府要幫,也不該以同一個方式幫。

強調居所的重要,是因為說到底,我們面對的主要是一個規劃的問題。如果某人在香港連住址也沒有一個,就算給他學位,很難保證他不會讀了半個學期就不讀了,這樣港府又如何對之提供(最少是和境內居民對等的)服務呢?

(至於假住址証明的問題,就算是香港境內也常見假住址混入名校校網,這點要另作討論。)

當然,以住址為標準,單非子女也會有困難,因為孩子都住在深圳。但我會說,他們的父或母是住在香港的,我們可以合理預期他們長遠也會在香港生活和貢獻,政府要為他們規劃服務也沒有特別大的困難,可以例外處理。

我想,只要要求入學者提供父或母的本港住址証明,已經能很準確地處理當前的資源問題,也不涉及族群上的歧視,和出生地、護照以至語言也無關,應該是一個出路。

* * *

但,有一點我倒要說一下。路上看到有橫額說「大埔的資源大埔人優先」,就叫我摸不著頭腦了。

大埔沒有自己的政府,沒有自己的稅收,大埔的學校也不歸大埔區議會去管理,所謂「大埔的資源」似乎有點難以理解。香港沒有地方級別的行政區,我可不想有天去到中西區乘涼的時候,會被質疑我不是中西區的居民;再者,中西區對港府庫房的人均貢獻恐怕比大埔區的多,我怕有天就算我在大埔行街也會被中西區的居民說我佔了他們的便宜。

我想到「大埔的資源」的唯一解釋,就是港府規劃這些資源的時候是以當地人口為規劃基準。然而同一道理也可以放在不同的空間尺度,例如「富善邨的資源富善人優先」、「大明里的資源大明里人優先」,沒完沒了無厘頭。

我絕對支持大埔的小孩優先在大埔上學,理由是就近入學對小孩子好,而不是因為這些學校是「大埔的資源」。

反對外來需求擾亂當地社會,是合理的訴求,但變成「大埔的資源大埔人優先」這種口號,卻可以被引伸出上述的無厘頭訴求,似乎顯示了政治論述的不成熟。如果真的相信「大埔的資源」這個概念應該存在,不如先推動地方行政改革,多講學校和社區脈絡的關係,我會很支持啊!

Hyperloop 簡介:化整為零

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先前決定開這個博,其中一個理由是想寫一些報紙出不了的科技評論,現在來了。

早陣子,鬼才Elon Musk提出了Hyperloop的概念,美國那邊熱切期待,香港這邊卻好像沒有人明白似的。特別是蘋果後來的報道,還說什麼「收地將會是一大阻力」,我懷疑記者連Musk寫的計劃書引言也沒看過,不然不可能錯得這樣離譜。

Hyperloop,簡而言之,是一種時速一千公里的運輸系統,比高鐵還要快數倍。以這種速度,香港到北京也只是兩個多小時,比飛機還要快。而Musk表示只要用當今科技就能做到,這固然讓人吃驚,反對之聲也不少。但要明白Hyperloop,你得拋開一些對集體運輸的成見,無謂評論的時候捉錯用神。

要明白Hyperloop,首要明白一個概念:化整為零。Hyperloop只有28個座位,一抽高鐵列車的載客量卻是數以百計的。這是因為在新時代的集體運輸當中,我們要逆向思考。

為什麼小比大好?為簡化討論,我們先來做一個想像實驗:同樣是1000個座位,應該造10架有100個座位的長列車,還是100架只有10個座位的小車?這簡單的問題,有決定性的影響。

首先,猜一猜,是10×100還是100×10的建造費用便宜?當然是後者。同一個東西造100次比造10次,攤分開的研發成本是便宜了,畢竟是大量生產。再者,造一架10座位的小車怎也比造一架100座位的長列車簡單,也就是有能力入標的工廠增加,競爭又帶來價格下降。

然後是基建費用。要乘載一連串小車的基建,肯定比要支撐一整列的長列車要來得輕巧,於是建造成本又大幅降低。Hyperloop的策略就是全架空走線,所以收地成本遠遠比在地面走的鐵路以低。

看到這兒,你或者會問:小車相對於長列車,運客能力不會大大降低了嗎?非也,還得看班次和服務方式。

一抽長列車搭載乘客很多,他們當中不會每一個人的目的地都一樣,列車也就要中途停站。前面的車未開,後面的車不可以走得太近,班次在這兒就有限制(大家對於港鐵的「由於前面列車尚未開出」不會陌生)。小車呢?因為每架小車的乘客不多,可以想像為的士一樣的點對點服務。你可以想像當你走到港鐵車站,看見的不是兩個長月台而是幾十個超小型的月台,每個月台放有一架空車點對點的送你到任何一個港鐵車站;而每個港鐵車站也好像沙田或者大埔墟一樣,容許不用停站的車輛繞站而過。這樣,路上的車輛基本上都不用不斷加速減速,而可以全程均速行走;於是乎,兩架車輛之間的距離便可以很短,班次可以極高;車和車之間的距離甚至可以短於剎車距離,因為按照力學第一定律,沒有一輛行走中的車輛是會零秒停下來的,如果前車故障電腦可以立即提示後面的所有車輛也按前車同樣的減速率停下來,也就不用擔心剎車距離的問題。

如是者,小車的班次可以遠遠比長列車要密。曾經看過某個的電腦模型,只要所有車輛也是電腦控制,排除了緩慢的人手反應,報告認為兩秒鐘一班車也是過份充裕,而不是當今高鐵的最多兩分鐘一班。回到Hyperloop,Musk提議的是兩分鐘一班,這種班次在中國當然不夠運量,但承上文討論,要大幅增加發車密度並不困難。

說到班次,就得說服務。同樣要運送1000人,100座位的話就開10班,10座位的話就開100班。對於乘客來說,後者肯定較好,因為等車時間會時前者的十分之一,甚至是近乎於隨上隨走。

從班次,我們就可以說到環保。為了保持班次,高鐵不可能真的每次也等到客滿才出發,非繁忙時間就算只有很少客量也要整抽車出發,其實不甚環保。變成一系列的小車之後,有多少客量就開多少架小車,運量的彈性就大很多,有客開車沒客就泊在站內等客,換言之也就更環保。

以上介紹這種化整為零的策略,並不是Hyperloop首創。整套邏輯源自於 Personal Rapid Transit ,概念有了數十年,近年的電腦運算能力終於可以實踐,現在在倫敦希斯路機場就有示範線。Hyperloop很大程度上就是 Personal Rapid Transit 的加快和擴大版。傳統集體運輸的想法,凡事都講求「集體」,每班車運送的人越多越好。但在不需要司機的電腦時代,這種想法未必再合時宜,反而要逆向思考。

至於Hyperloop是如何做到時速一千公里,同樣是用了一些逆向思考的方法,這個我們下次再談。

麥理浩與鄧小平於1979年的會面紀錄

是日報章繼續討論英政府在後九七香港的角色。陰謀論我不想談,我只想看證據。上次轉貼的英國解密檔案引來不少興趣,這兒再轉貼一份對香港前途十分重要的文件:麥理浩與鄧小平的會面紀錄。檔案編號是 FCO 40/1050 Visit of Sir Murray McLehose, Governor of HK, to China, March_April 1979。就讓我們重新去看,在香港前途問題上,中國和英國當時到底在想什麼,對香港普羅大眾的生活是否重視。看原文,比看昨天今天各方各派的修詞擺姿態要好。

 

SECRET

 

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HE THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG AND HE VICE-PREMIER DENG XIAOPING AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE AT 1000 HOURS ON 29 MARCH 1979

 

HE Sir Murray MacLehose

HM Ambassador

Sir Y K Kan

Dr D C Wilson

Mr T J B George 

 

HE Mr Deng Xiaoping

HE Mr Liao Chengzhi, Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC

HE Mr Li Qiang, Minister of Foreign Trade

HE Mr Song Zhiguang, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr Cui Mingtang, Western European Dept, MFA 

 

After Initial courtesies, Deng Xiaoping said that the Governor had had talks with Li Qiang and would be speaking to Liao Chengzhi and Huang Hun, and could take up specific questions with them. He said that relations between Guangdong and Hong Kong were good, although some questions were difficult to solve. He understood that the people of Hong Kong were concerned about the future status of Hong Kong. China had a consistent policy : sovereignty over Hong Kong belonged to China. But Hong Kong had her own special status. People were concerned about the way out for the New Territories in 1997. This was still 18 years away. This was not a long time. There might be specific discussions by that time taking account of the circumstances of the day. Any solution of the status (of the New Territories) would have as its prerequisite that Hong Kong was part of China. But it could be said with certainty that, when the two sides discussed the question, China would respect the special status of Hong Kong. People were concerned about investment. The Chinese Government gave a clear assurance that, when there was a political solution, it would never affect investments. 

2. Turning to Macao, Deng said that China had not taken over Macao and had not even raised the issue with the Portuguese. The UK would be aware also of China’s policy towards Taiwan. The Chinese Government had often said that the return of Taiwan would involve respecting the special status of Taiwan. There would be no change in the social system, nor would living standards be affected. 

Taiwan could still enjoy a special status and local autonomy, and even her own armed forces, even though she would be part of China. There could never be two Chinas or one and a half Chinas. This was the Chinese position on Hong Kong and Macao as well as on Taiwan. This was a long standing policy. They had adopted it because they needed Hong Kong. The policy was beneficial to socialist construction and the four modernisations. It was as simple as that. 

3. The Governor thanked Mr Deng Xiaoping for his welcome and for his remarks. His visit had arisen out of a meeting with Li Qiang in Hong Kong. Li had spoken of Hong Kong’s usefulness to China’s economy. There was a requirement for close cooperation. Talks in Guangzhou and in Peking had demonstrated that there was mutual benefit from cooperation on industry, transport and tourism. The Governor agreed with the Vice-Premier that Hong Kong was of benefit to socialist construction. Hong Kong was an unusual place with an extraordinary concentration of industrial capacity, commercial knowledge, tourism and communications. It had its problems. It was dependent on export markets and the economies of those countries. Trade promotion was of vital importance, and Sir Y K Kan had special responsibility for that. Hong Kong was dependent on China for water and he had discussed solutions to this problem in Guangzhou. The Governor was grateful for China’s help in this matter. There were also problems of land. Hong Kong was both over-crowded and mountainous. Reclamation to make land for new towns was necessary. But so long as investment continued there was the prospect of great prosperity. Each family in Hong Kong would consume US $100 of Chinese goods each month. There was much scope for other trade and for increased cooperation. 

4. The Governor continued that the Vice-Premier had spoken of the long term future and had made the position very clear. That was a matter between the CPG and HMG. It was frequently said that the problem could be solved when the time was ripe. But Hong Kong faced an immediate problem, concerning the leases issued to people in the New Territories which ran into tens of thousands, and were being issued each month by the hundred. They were all written with a validity lasting only until June 1997. As the time of the leases shortened the clock ticked away. This would deter the sort of investment Hong Kong wanted (though not perhaps speculative investment). It was the subject of speculation. The Governor said that the matter was not relevant to the Chinese position on Hong Kong, but it increased his own problems. He had thought of something which he could do to solve the problem and which was not contradictory to China’s well known position. If this problem could be solved, the right sort of investment could be attracted to keep Hong Kong competitive in world markets. This would be of benefit to China as well as to the UK. 

5. Concluding his opening remarks, the Governor mentioned immigration, saying that too many people were coming with or without permits. For some people to come in was good, but a surfeit caused indigestion. He had discussed the matter in Guangzhou and thought that in principle the matter could be solved. He would pursue it with the tlinistry of Foreign Affairs. 

6. Deng Xiaoping said that the problem of people was fully understood. It could be solved in two ways. One was that China would adopt measures to reduce pressure on Hong Kong. This did not mean that she had not adopted measures; but the results had not been remarkable, and more effective measures would be taken. On the other hand it would be advisable for private investors to put more money into Guangdong and raise living standards there so that it was not necessary for people to go to Hong Kong. The Governor commented that he had discussed investment in Guangdong and considered that there should be some merging of interests between Hong Kong and Guangdong. Deng Xiaoping said that this assistance could adopt many forms : investment, joint ventures or compensation trading. There would always be some gap between Hong Kong’s living standards and that of Guangdong; but it could be narrowed. The question could only be solved with the realisation of China’s four modernisations. But part of the problem could be solved now. People near Hong Kong saw that the gap was too big, and it was natural for them to go, even without permission. Time was needed for the four modernisations. China had a big population problem and the management of 900 million people was more difficult than that of running Hong Kong. In discussing any problem, it was necessary to take account of many factors. He instanced Shanghai with a population of 10 million. It would be easy for Shanghai to develop like Hong Kong, but if this happened people would crowd into Shanghai. So China pursued development on a broader front. China had to adopt policies which paid attention to the overall situation. 

7. The Governor commented that there was a long term and a short term problem. He would certainly encourage investors to help with the long term problem. If there was a profit involved then no encouragement would be needed. In the short term, as the Vice-Premier had said, measures would be necessary if the standard of living was not to be undermined. Shanghai was at least flat, whereas Hong Kong possessed no space. 

8. Deng Xiaoping replied that Shanghai had reached saturation point and that Guangdong was also too big with insufficient employment. Investment would create employment and release pressure on Hong Kong. He said that China was considering legislation to protect the profits of investors. They would protect the interests of Chinese, Overseas Chinese and foreign investors. Outside investors could adopt their own management methods, which would be protected by law. They could assist with the marketing of Chinese goods. The Governor confirmed that he would encourage investors. He saw no problem at the official level which could not be solved through discussions.  

9. Deng Xiaoping agreed that these issues could be pursued elsewhere. Reverting to the New Territories lease, he said that he formally requested the Governor to ask investors to put their hearts at ease. It was China’s long term policy to regard Hong Kong as a special case, no matter what political solution was reached by 1997. The Governor said that the problem could not be overcome by generalised assurances. What he had in mind was replacing the leases valid to 1997 with leases valid as long as Britain administered the New Territories. This would get rid of the date.  

10. Deng Xiaoping commented that it would be best to avoid wording which mentioned continuing British administration. It would be better to say that, since the Chinese Government had expressed its political view, all would be well for investment. The future of Hong Kong was guaranteed, but he could not confirm that the political situation 

would remain unchanged since that would affect the Chinese position. The Governor said that what he proposed did not affect the Chinese position. Deng Xiaoping said good. The Governor said he had many potential investors who were concerned not about the CPG’s attitude but about the date of the lease. He wanted no date. Deng Xiaoping declared that the Chinese position would not affect the interests of investors. To put it more clearly, in this century and in the beginning of the next century (this was originally translated as “in the next century") Hong Kong would be continuing with a capitalist system, while China was continuing with a socialist system. By 1997 China might take over Hong Kong. But this would not affect her economy. They had not taken over Macao so far. There were two solutions by 1997, to take Hong Kong over, or to allow present realities to remain. Whatever political solution was adopted, Investors would not be affected. The Governor said that what he proposed to do would not affect the Chinese position. All China needed to do was to acquiesce, or not to object. But he had to do something over the next year or two, if investment was to continue to come in. Deng Xiaoping said there would be nothing for the Chinese to do, and Cui Mingtang intervened that the UK only wished to abolish the 1997 date on the leases. Deng Xiaoping concluded that the key point was that investors should feel easy. 

11. The meeting then closed with courtesies at 11am. 

 

我不打算再轉發這些文件了。上次和學生在國立檔案館待的時間不是很長,只向他們介紹了幾份最重要的文件。當天閱覽室的人太多,沒能待太久。有興趣的記者朋友,可以自己去國立檔案館慢慢看,反正都是公開的。不過進入閱覽室之前,最後先有一些處理歷史文獻的經驗,否則一不留神破損了香港的歷史,可是大家都不想發生的事情啊!

英國政府於1976年時對香港前途的評估

最近英國政府在香港民主進程的位置又再一次受傳媒注意,引起不少討論。九七至今已有十六年,現在的中學生許多都是特區孩子,對英國管治只有想像的機會。剛好今年六月我帶了一批中文大學的學生到訪倫敦的英國國立檔案館,和他們介紹檔案對於全面認識歷史的重要。我在這兒引用一些在檔案館找到的歷史文件,望能給各位多一個角度思考。

文件來自檔案編號 FCO40/701 Planning Paper of Future Progress of Hong Kong part A ,一份有關香港前途規劃的草稿,由外交及聯邦事務部草擬。由於版權所限,不能把照片放上來,只能原文逐字引用。下文為 1976 年3月草稿版本的附錄 B ,提出了香港前途的各種可能:

SECRET

ANNEX B

Alternative Futures for Hong Kong

(a) Continuance of the present status quo up to and beyond 1997 by negotiated and public agreement with the Chinese.

Prospects: Doubtful. Such an agreement would involve overt Chinese agreement to the continuance of colonial status which may be ideologically unacceptable and difficult to defend against Russian propaganda in the Third World. In the UK interest in view of the contingent immigration liability but increasingly difficult to defend politically here against the background of decolonisation generally; and postponement of the problem will not make it easier to solve in the longer term. Dependent on continuance of present Chinese policy into the 21st century and continued control of Peking Government over China generally. Confidence-building in Hong Kong.

(b) Continuance of the present status quo up to and beyond 1997 with tacit Chinese acquiescence.

Prospects: Easier to achieve than (a) but in some ways less favourable to the UK. CHina free to terminate at any time: UK’s ultimate negotiating position correspondingly weaker. Less good for confidence in Hong Kong but tolerable.

(c) Continuance of the Present status quo in exchange for recognition, either explicit or implicit, of Chinese sovereignty and, in the other direction, of UK as good sitting tenants. Probably consequence: appointment of Chinese Government ‘representative’ in Hong Kong.

Prospects: Promising. Probably sufficient to reconcile Chinese ideological and pragmatic desiderata. Confidence-building in Hong Kong; but appointment of Chinese representative could, in certain circumstances, risk erosion of Governor’s position and emergence of dual authority.

(d) As at (c) with freedom to move towards an elective system for the Legislative Council.

Prospects: Less promising than (c) but greatly to HMG’s advantage in making us less answerable for Hong Kong’s internal policies. Tolerable for Hong Kong.

(e) Process of evaluation whereby China gradually increases to cultural economic and political activities leading to appointment of an official Chinese representative.

Prospects: Possible but Hong Kong laws and administration would have to continue indefinitely and appropriate confidence building resources for investors taken by the Chinese. Not as satisfactory from UK point of view as formal arrangements. Probably tolerable for Hong Kong.

(f) UK/Chinese joint administration for a pre-determined (or indefinite) future.

Prospects:  Possible, provided ultimate Chinese sovereignty was recognised: but no real advantage to the UK and probably intolerable situation diplomatically. Very precarious and unlikely to maintain confidence in Hong Kong.

(g) UK withdrawal and recognition of Chinese sovereignty in exchange for Chinese recognition of a “special status” for Hong Kong with local Chinese accruing responsibility for internal government.

Prospects: Less promising than (c) or (d) but a possibility if pragmatic considerations are uppermost in Peking. Solution perhaps most acceptable to HMG but careful explanation would be necessary in Hong Kong and elsewhere if confidence is not to be eroded.

(h) UK withdrawal and negotiated Chinese takeover on an undertaking to allow a reasonable degree of local political and economic autonomy and security for existing population, business enterprises etc.

Prospects:  Probably the negotiated solution most acceptable to China but very difficult to sell to the population in Hong Kong and to investors. If possible at all, the agreement would need to contain firm safeguards which may be difficult to obtain.

(i) UK withdrawal and incorporation in China +- 1997.

Prospects: Remote unless the ideologues take over in Peking and disastrous if they do. Impossible to announce to population in Hong Kong and impossible to implement even gradually without agreement becoming obvious there. Grave political problems for HMG.

(j) Forcible Chinese takeover +- 1997.

Prospects: Remote (as at (h) above) and particularly disadvantageous economically to China. Likely to reduce the immigration liability on the UK but a moral diplomatic and political defeat of incalculable dimensions cf. Singapore 1941. Impossible to contemplate.

先向較年輕的朋友說明一下, HMG 是指 Her Majesty’s Government。從文中可見,英政府最關心的,當然是英國自身的利益,雖然這點也取決於香港社會本身、 英國內部,和國際社會的接受程度。值得注意的,此草稿的來自 1976 年3月,當時毛澤東仍然再生,鄧小平即將第三次下台,麥理浩還未有訪京,然而原來英國內部已經提到一些類似「一國兩制」的猜想。

我不是香港史的專家,要如何把這文件放在更廣闊的脈絡當中理解,各位要找這方面的高手。我僅僅想藉此指出一點:香港有一段殖民史,香港和英國的關係十分複雜,我們不如多看看這方面專家的研究,才再去討論英國在香港民主進程中的地位。口水戰太便宜,香港的過去和未來都值得更嚴謹的討論。

香港人的歌

香港人的身分認同,在香港的學術圈子一直是個重要的題目。特別是在九七前後的一段時間,有很多針對文化作品的分析。綜合來說,大家都很確定:香港的故事,不易講。

這兒是一些我收集回來,在課堂上給初來港的內地學生聽的,香港人自己訴說香港的歌曲。它們之間不乏矛盾,卻又起承轉合。我想這些歌是很好的切入點,好讓我們拒絕用三言兩語來總結香港人,或者香港精神,其實是什麼。

這當然不是一個完整的列表,只會我覺得有較代表性的例子。不過只看這些例子,也能看得出,一直以來,香港人對香港身分也相當的obsess。我覺得,我們應該要對得起這麼多年來的obsession:堅持「香港故事不易講」,就是對香港最好的捍衛,也是香港給其他地方最好的一課。

2001年夏 我在紐約

刊於明報世紀版 2013年9月10日。下為原稿。

——

有沒有聽過噴射戰機在你頭頂飛過的聲音?石崗機場沒有噴射戰機,駐港解放軍只有直升機,一般港人可能要跑到沖繩才能看到噴射戰機升降。但就算你是正牌軍事發燒友,真的跑到空軍機地面前觀摩,那聲音可能也不會過於震撼,只會覺得和啟德機場還未搬走前的九龍城差不多。再者,這是特地去看,特地去聽的。

我第一次聽到這聲音時,卻是毫無準備的。我記得,地點是羅德島。當時正值黃昏,magic hour,天空很美,我和幾個朋友在戶外聊天,四周出奇的寧靜。忽然間,沒有任何先兆的,兩點黑影在遠處出現,數秒後便在頭頂劃過,隆隆的聲音在此時才響起。後來我再細想,因為戰機正在超音速飛行,所以要到最接近的一刻才能開始聽到聲音。回神過來,友人道出一句:對了,空軍開始了東岸的空域巡邏。那是二零零一年的秋天。

我得說明,在那一刻,我或許有點感觸,卻未至於害怕。感觸,是因為首次發現自己活在一個處於戰爭狀態的國家。在香港長大,戰爭從來只會在新聞或紀錄片當中出現。未至於害怕,是因為知道這些是「己方」的戰機,不是要來投炸彈的。相對於後來在阿富汗或者是伊拉克,每天都要躲在地下室聽同一種聲音的平民百姓,我也太沒有資格感到害怕。

但這隆隆聲響,始終一直在我腦海中徘徊不止。有時午夜夢迴,我還是會隱約聽見,雖然我懷疑其實只是剛好有民航客機在上空飛過。又或者,九一一真的為我帶來一些不能磨滅的什麼。九一一,是否一個分水嶺?

我在二千年的八月到美國,待了差不多七年的時間,親身經歷了「後九一一」的美國社會。其中,我有兩段時間在紐約市生活,頭一次是零一年的夏天,第二次是零二年的春天。九一一的時候,我剛好回去麻省寫碩士論文。我很記得,雙子塔在紐約的天際線曾經無處不在;後來紐約人因為那「忽然空曠的天空」而失落,我感同身受。

那時候,電視新聞常說:「世界從此變得不一樣」。十二年過去,真的變得不一樣嗎?在最初的那段日子,答案是肯定的。路過中央車站,每個轉角也有兩名全副武裝的大兵守衛,我害怕它們手上的機槍走火遠遠多於恐怖份子;每天上班通過喬治華盛頓大橋,橋下駐有陸軍的悍馬裝甲車,據說是要防止炸橋陰謀。時至今日,這些士兵早已經撤走了,但我們每次到機場還是要在安檢門前趕緊脫鞋和取出手提電腦,在忙於拿透明膠袋重新整理洗頭水和護髮素的時候掉失錢包和電話,也算是某種「變得不一樣」吧?

宏觀一點去看,國際關係的思維或者也改變了。當時的美國軍部還是處於冷戰思維,以為要防範的都是從外而來的襲擊,雷達搜尋的對象從北極來的洲際導彈。當第一架客機撞進世貿大樓之後,空軍才發現美國本土沒有準備好的戰機可用,臨時升空的連彈藥也沒帶,如果不是聯合九十三號航班的乘客自己起來反抗,當時的命令是叫戰機機師如神風隊一樣撞向客機來保護首都。

至此之後,不單空軍要準備好隨時候命,整個戰爭邏輯也隨之而改寫。國土安全成為了最重要的題目,如何應對什麼生化襲擊的研究可以拿到用不完的經費,「在彼方打擊敵人才能避免自家門前開戰」成為了鷹派政客套取選票的最佳方法。危機社會被推至極點,衣食住行沒有一個環節不被拉扯到反恐戰爭當中。

但,從這進路再想下去,九一一也可以說成是什麼也沒有改變過。理論一點去解釋:權力永遠只會關心如何擁有更多的權力,建制永遠只會關心如何自我再造,問題只是用什麼來作藉口。回看中國近代史,從帝王、軍伐、共和、共產到走資,革命革命再革命,到頭來每一朝強調的都是國家機器的角色。就算立國之本是嚮往自由的美國,難道又可以幸免於此?就算沒有九一一,你以為布殊後面的利益集團不會找到別的理由擴張?又,奧巴馬上台四年多了,前任留下來的種種體制特權,他是廢除了的多還是保留了的多?

越說下去好像越沒意思,唯有回去問一問自己,九一一所留下的,除了腦海深處的隆隆聲響,是否也帶來一點做人態度的改變。但我發現,相對於一個國家,就算只問一個人有沒有變得不一樣,原來也毫不容易。

九一一有沒有讓我更喜歡或討厭美國?都有。在美國生活,就算未至於在聽到愛國歌曲之時感動流淚,也最少會接觸到直接被影響的人和事。居於紐約時每天都會經過那些放滿鮮花和悼念語句的消防局和警署,他們都是英雄,我無法如某些憤青一樣幸災樂禍。但我也數得出美國支持的政變和入侵,想起來也有敘利亞伊朗危地馬拉尼加拉瓜古巴剛果多明尼加格蘭納達南越土耳其巴拿馬和智利,而這肯定是一個不完整的名單。看到九一一後各路政客如何抽水,電視評論變相鼓勵民眾對國際社會無知,我看到美國將會繼續在世界各地製造不幸,又教我如何不能感到討厭。

九一一有沒有讓我更反對或支持戰爭?都有。美國的大學不同香港,到處都有軍人。你的宿舍鄰居是退伍軍人,你的學生是儲備軍人,我還到過大學儲備軍官團那兒講課,他們送的空軍保暖杯我還放在杯架。香港人討論家長要不要跟隨子女到大學開學,我見到的是我們大學的學生被征召入伍,父母開車尾隨著軍車要送他們的子女到軍事基地報到,長長的車龍一直開了數小時。此情此境,我感到嘔心。然而,你問我有沒有不要他們出征的方法,我可以和你說世上有很多不公義的戰爭,我還可以說紛爭最終還是要靠滅貧和理解來解決,但在那天來到之前,我又說不出所有的武力都是不必要的。

每當什麼紀念日,我們總難免要回望這去,展望將來。說某件事件重要或不重要,就好像在問歷史有沒有如果一樣。我們都知道,事情的發生既有宏觀的社會背景,也有即時的偶發因素,而個人在其中往往相當渺小。或者,我們很記得很記得一件事,一片風景,或一種聲音,未必是因為它客觀上如何改變了我們,而是我們後的主觀投射如何從新解釋它對我們的意義。例如九七前的香港人往往被批為自大和貪婪,難道九七之後就一夜之間不懂得自大和貪婪嗎?還是外在環境的轉變,使得這些性格以別的方式展現出來?更可能的,是今天的我們很有需要告訴世界和自己,九七後的香港如何改變了,九七是一個分水嶺。換個很俗套很俗套的說法:所有的歷史都是當代史。儘管每一個的改變,後面往往有更多的不變。

只是,世貿遺址每年一度的向曼克頓夜空射出兩條光柱以作悼念,還是會凝著我的目光。

Tamamandering

早兩天看《信報》造了個新字,叫 Tamamandering,笑了出來。新字來自 Gerrymandering,就是亂改選區畫界來確保某個派別的候選人勝出。 Tama 不是粗口,現任政制局長譚氏是也,因為他現正放風要搞新界北選區。實情未來普選立法會要行單議席單票還是比例代表制,後者該是大選區還是小選區,都未有諮詢討論,卻走來說要搞新界北選區,未免本末倒置,也看得出政府是如何看待政改。

Anyway,趁機會,介紹幾個 Gerrymandering 最過份的例子給大家看看:

MD District 03

IL District 04

NC District 12

意識流

話說在五年前,我發明了這樣的一個遊戲,本來是無聊和朋友玩的,後來試試在wiki玩可不可以。這東西還在,歡迎大家繼續玩下去。

遊戲規則是,看到最後一個項目,然後作一個聯想,然後再從這聯想再作一個聯想,是為新的項目。至於中間的那個聯想,則放在最下面,是為給其他人猜的迷底。例如最後一個項目是「政總」,你可以下面寫「門神」,然後再加註「門常開」在最底。

明白沒有?來吧